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1. Introduction 
Unlike in physics, the category of thought experiment is not very common in biology. 
At least there are no classic examples that are as important and as well-known as the 10	  
most famous thought experiments in physics, such as Galileo’s, Maxwell’s or 
Einstein’s. The reasons for this are far from obvious; maybe it has to do with the fact 
that modern biology for the most part sees itself as a thoroughly empirical discipline 
that engages either in real natural history or in experimenting on real organisms rather 
than fictive ones. While theoretical biology does exist and is recognized as part of 15	  
biology, its role within biology appears to be more marginal than the role of theoretical 
physics within physics. It could be that this marginality of theory also affects thought 
experiments as sources of theoretical knowledge.  
 Of course, none of this provides a sufficient reason for thinking that thought 
experiments are really unimportant in biology. It is quite possible that the common 20	  
perception of this matter is wrong and that there are important theoretical considerations 
in biology, past or present, that deserve the title of thought experiment just as much as 
the standard examples from physics. Some such considerations may even be widely 
known and considered to be important, but were not recognized as thought experiments. 
In fact, as we shall see, there are reasons for thinking that what is arguably the single 25	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most important biological work ever, Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species, 
contains a number of thought experiments. There are also more recent examples both in 
evolutionary and non-evolutionary biology, as we will show. 
Part of the problem in identifying positive examples in the history of biology is the 
lack of agreement as to what exactly a thought experiment is. Even worse, there may 5	  
not be more than a family resemblance that unifies this epistemic category. We take it 
that classical thought experiments show the following characteristics: (1) They serve 
directly or indirectly in the non-empirical epistemic evaluation of theoretical 
propositions, explanations or hypotheses. (2) Thought experiments somehow appeal to 
the imagination (so a purely mechanical deduction or calculation from theoretical 10	  
principles would not count as a thought experiment). (3) They involve hypothetical 
scenarios, which may or may not be fictive. In other words, thought experiments 
suppose that certain states of affairs hold (irrespectively of whether they obtain in the 
actual world or not) and then try to intuit what would happen in a world where these 
suppositions are true.  15	  
We want to examine in the following sections if there are episodes in the history of 
biology that satisfy these criteria. As we will show, there are a few episodes that might 
satisfy all three of these criteria, and many more if the imagination criterion (2) is 
dropped or understood in a lose sense. In any case, this criterion is somewhat vague in 
the first place, unless a specific account of the imagination is presupposed. There will 20	  
also be issues as to what exactly “non-empirical” means. In general, for the sake of 
discussion we propose to understand the term “thought experiment” here in a broad 
rather than a narrow sense here. We would rather be guilty of having too wide a 








There are several places in the work of Darwin where he resorts to hypothetical 5	  
scenarios in the course of presenting his theories. The best known cases are those from 
Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1859) discussed by Lennox (1991), but similar 
imaginary cases can be found in The Descent of Man (1871) as well as in his essay of 
1844 and it is likely that there are even more. The reason is that Darwin, due to the 
speculative character of his endeavor, very often presents hypothetical explanations and 10	  
each of them could potentially qualify as thought experiment. In any case, we will have 
to restrict ourselves here to the presentation of the canonical cases discovered by 
Lennox and discuss their epistemic role in the context of the Origin as well as their 
specific features.  
Lennox argues that Darwin’s hypothetical cases play a crucial role in his 15	  
argumentation in the Origin. According to Lennox, their role is to show the explanatory 
potential of Darwin’s theory rather than to serve as evidence for the theory’s truth. 
Thus, they aim at showing that the theory of natural selection can explain such things as 
species transformation, appearance of new species, and the extraordinary adaptation of 
organisms to their environment, but not that it actually does explain these phenomena. 20	  
The following “imaginary illustrations”, as Darwin calls them, probably prompted the 
well-known criticism by Fleeming Jenkin (Hull 1973), in which Jenkin also uses 
hypothetical scenarios against Darwin’s idea of natural selection.1  Jenkin thus provided 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Although Jenkin falsely concludes from his imaginary cases that natural selection cannot 
explains speciation, his criticism goes right to the point by targeting the importance of the 
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what Brown (1991) calls a counter thought experiment, which led Darwin to refine his 
original thought experiment. 
The following case is one of the two “imaginary illustrations” presented by Darwin 
in the end of the fourth chapter of the Origin. It is the paradigm of Lennox’s “Darwinian 
thought experiments”:2 5	  
 
Let us take the case of a wolf, which preys on various animals, securing some by 
craft, some by strength, and some by fleetness; and let us suppose that the fleetest 
prey, a deer for instance, had from any change in the country increased in 
numbers, or that other prey had decreased in numbers, during that season of the 10	  
year when the wolf is hardest pressed for food. I can under such circumstances see 
no reason to doubt that the swiftest and slimmest wolves would have the best 
chance of surviving, and so be preserved or selected. […] 
Now, if any slight innate change of habit or of structure benefited an individual 
wolf, it would have the best chance of surviving and of leaving offspring. Some of 15	  
its young would probably inherit the same habits or structure, and by the 
repetition of this process, a new variety might be formed which would either 
supplant or coexist with the parent-form of wolf. (Darwin, 1859, pp. 90–91) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
frequency of variation and the problem of inheritance type, which led Darwin to slightly 
modify his thought experiments in the later versions of the Origin (Lennox 1991, Morris 
1994, Bulmer 1999). 
2 This thought experiment is directly followed by another one, which we will not 
reproduce here for the sake of brevity. It pertains to the explanation of mutual 
adaptations of bees and flowers. Other thought experiments can be found in Chapters 




Lennox considers this passage as a thought experiment, for it displays an imaginary 
situation and provides support to Darwin’s theory. Furthermore, he points out three 
aspects of Darwin’s illustrations, which, he claims, constitute jointly sufficient criteria 
for characterizing a thought experiment: First, the thought experiment should evoke 5	  
concrete objects or processes in order to “give […] the feeling of experimentation”, 
which cannot be obtained by staying at the level of abstract theories. Second, the 
described situation should be plausible. This is normally ensured by referring to familiar 
objects and processes that “could happen, in a fairly robust sense of ‘could’”. Finally, it 
should relate to the theoretical claim to which it lends support by instantiating some of 10	  
its essential features (see Lennox, 1991, pp. 229–230). 
Concerning the epistemic role of these thought experiments, Lennox’s thesis that 
Darwin did not intend them as providing direct evidence for natural selection is 
supported in several ways. Darwin’s use of the expression “imaginary illustrations” as 
well as the subjunctive mood already give quite strong indications. Furthermore, 15	  
Darwin makes explicit that the aim of the chapter is not to provide a proof for the theory 
of natural selection: “[w]hether natural selection has really thus acted in nature […] 
must be judged of by the general tenour and balance of evidence given in the following 
chapters” (Darwin, 1859, p. 127). On the other hand, the claim according to which these 
thought experiments aim at showing the explanatory power of the theory also fits the 20	  
general plan of the Origin. They are located in Chapter Four, which, according to a 
synoptic view of ‘Darwin’s argument’ proposed by Waters (2003), has the role of 
showing that natural selection is an “adequate” explanation in the Herschelian sense of 
establishing a vera causa, which precisely amounts to showing that the theory could 
explain speciation and adaptation. 25	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The view that the role of thought experiments is to evaluate a theory’s explanatory 
potential is shared also by Kuhn (1977). But according to Kuhn, thought experiments 
can advance science only by showing a theory’s failure. According to Lennox, there is 
no such asymmetry. Thought experiments, like in the case presented above, can also 
provide positive support regarding a theory’s explanatory potential. This probably 5	  
constitutes the most specific feature of Lennox’s concept of “Darwinian thought 
experiments”. 
Restricting the role of thought experiments to an assessment of the potential or 
possible truth of an explanation grants them a legitimate role in science even if that role 
is “independent of empirical support of a theory’s truth” (Lennox, 1991, p. 237). To 10	  
illustrate this, Lennox takes the case of the philosophical debate over adaptationism 
(Gould & Lewontin, 1979, Kitcher, 1982, p. 60, Kitcher, 1985, p. 226, cited by Lennox, 
1991, p. 240). This debate is rooted in a criticism of the tendency to explain everything 
in nature with help of natural selection, which amounts to considering any feature of an 
organism as an adaptation. On Lennox’s view, adaptationism helps to explore natural 15	  
selection theory’s explanatory scope no matter whether it (adaptationism) is true or 
false. Similarly, thought experiments do not speak for the truth or falsity of a theory, but 
they can serve to fathom and bring support to a theory’s explanatory potential. 
Lennox’s account of Darwinian thought experiments raises many interesting issues. 
A first issue concerns the identification and the limits of the epistemic category of 20	  
thought experiments, another one the psychological aspects related to the evaluation of 
the explanatory power of a theory by means of Darwinian thought experiments. We 
shall discuss these two issues in turn. 
Concerning the first issue, it should be noted that, although Darwin calls them 
“imaginary illustrations”, the thought experiments of Chapter Four in the Origin are 25	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supported by observational data. For instance, in the wolf pack case, Darwin appeals to 
evidence regarding the heritability of fleetness observed in greyhounds or of the 
tendency to prey on specific animals observed in domestic cats. He also mentions two 
varieties of wolves observed in the Catskill Mountains in New York that may instantiate 
the process proposed in the thought experiment. Lennox interprets this appeal to 5	  
experimental data as a way to improve the plausibility of the thought experiments, but it 
also restricts the extent to which these illustrations can be considered as imaginary. The 
imaginary part of the illustration here seems to be the explanatory process rather than 
the particular case at stake, which is real. The same can be said of other Darwinian 
thought experiments in the Origin. 10	  
Should any hypothetical scenario pertaining to a theoretical claim about a particular 
matter of fact considered to be a thought experiment? If not, then what restriction could 
prevent such an explosion of the category? Kuhn (1977), on his part, provides a 
restriction by limiting thought experiments to situations of conceptual conflict arising 
during scientific crisis. But why should this be so? By generalizing Kuhn’s definition to 15	  
imagined cases directly supporting a theory, thought experimenting appears to be a 
much broader category than is usually supposed. The only distinction between a thought 
experiment and any theoretical claim submitted to the diligent judgment of the reader 
seems to be, in Lennox’s view, the appeal to concrete objects or processes.  
This brings us to the second issue, the psychological aspects of thought 20	  
experimenting and the requirement of concreteness. To what extend and how does the 
appeal to concrete object or processes help in evaluating the explanatory potential of a 
theory? It should be noted that one of the main differences between the mind and the 
laboratory is that the objects manipulated within the mind are abstract to begin with, 
therefore it isn’t obvious why thought experiments should be restricted to imagining 25	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concrete cases. A possible argument might be that supporting a theory must necessarily 
involve a reference to one of its particular instances, as suggested by Lennox. But even 
if such a principle is granted for empirical support, it is not clear if this principle 
transfers to thought experiments, which often seem to appeal to a type of instance, not 
any concrete case (cf. Maxwell’s demon-type scenarios, which seem to be generic rather 5	  
than particular).  
 
3. Population Genetics and Natural Selection Theory 
Darwin’s theory of natural selection was thoroughly transformed in the early 20th 
Century due to the work of mathematical population geneticists, most notably R.A. 10	  
Fisher, J.B.S. Haldane and S. Wright (Provine 1971). These scientists provided a series 
of mathematical models describing the evolution of gene frequencies in populations of 
sexually reproducing organisms under the influence of evolutionary forces such as 
natural selection or random drift. This work culminated in a synthesis of Darwinian 
thought with more recent discoveries in genetics, in particular Mendel’s laws as well as 15	  
the chromosomal mechanisms of inheritance. Before these mathematical models 
existed, the theory of natural selection was still controversial and thought to be 
incompatible with modern genetics. The reason was that genetics was seen as being 
concerned only with discrete mutations, which seemed to suggest a saltationist theory of 
evolution, i.e., evolution through discontinuous leaps or “hopeful monsters” rather than 20	  
Darwin’s idea of a gradual adaptive process (Mayr 1982). But especially the work of 
Fisher proved that Mendelian inheritance can give rise to continuous variation that 
provides the material for natural selection to act on, and that selection is theoretically 
effective in changing the frequencies of genes in a population. In addition, Fisher 
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provided theoretical models that could explain the abundance of species that reproduce 
sexually as well as other frequently encountered traits.   
The introduction to Fisher’s extremely influential book The Genetical Theory of 
Natural Selection (Fisher 1930) appears to announce a thought experiment: 
 5	  
No practical biologist interested in sexual reproduction would be led to work out 
the detailed consequences experienced by organisms having three or more sexes; 
yet what else should he do if he wishes to understand why sexes are in fact, 
always two? (Fisher 1930, ix). 
 10	  
In this passage, Fisher seems to suggest that, in order to understand why actual 
organisms normally come in two sexes, it is necessary to examine hypothetical 
organisms with three or more sexes. Only if the evolutionary consequences of having 
one, two, three or more sexes are understood, can we hope to understand why two sexes 
are so common. While this looks like a thought experiment, the curious reader will look 15	  
for it in vain in the rest of the book. Fisher does not come back to the issue; he only 
offers a model describing the advantages of sexual reproduction in general over asexual 
reproduction. Furthermore, as Weisberg (2013) has pointed out, the problem as stated in 
Fisher’s book is underspecified. For example, he doesn’t say if all the 3 or n sexes are 
supposed to be necessary for producing offspring or if different mating types (i.e., 20	  
subtypes of a species that can only produce offspring with members from a different 
type) would also count. Depending on how the 3- or n-sex biology is understood, it is 
not fictive at all but has well-known precedents in nature (see Weisberg 2013, pp. 131-
134). However, Fisher’s intention was clearly to describe a non-existent entity with his 
three or more sexes.  25	  
10 
	  
Perhaps Fisher’s example should not be taken too literally; in fact, its purpose 
according to Fisher is only to illustrate the advantages of approaching evolutionary 
problems from a mathematical point of view, which Fisher claims, is characterized by a 
specific kind of imagination.3 But Fisher’s thought experiment also illustrates a general 
strategy that characterizes his approach and that is very often used in evolutionary 5	  
biology: When considering a trait, biologists first define a character space that contains 
all the possible values that the trait can take. For example, take the ratio of male and 
female offspring that the female of a given species produces on average. In many 
species, this ratio is close to 1:1, but in theory it could take any value, so long as it is a 
rational number. Let us call this space of values the character space. This space defines 10	  
a set of logical possibilities; thus the idea is not that each value of the space could 
actually be realized. As Darwin already noted, there could be “laws of growth” that 
prevent some character values of being realized. Thus, there will be a subspace of 
character values that is logically as well as biologically possible. Evolution will only be 
capable of producing organisms within the subspace of biologically possible character 15	  
values. 
This approach can be seen at work in a field known as “life history theory” (Stearns 
1992). Life histories (or life cycles) involve traits such as the age of onset of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Fisher suggests that “[…] the intelligence, properly speaking, is little influenced by the 
effects of training. What is profoundly susceptible of training is the imagination, and 
mathematicians and biologists seem to differ enormously in the manner in which their 
imaginations are employed” (Fisher 1930, p. viii). Furthermore, “[i]t seems impossible that 
full justice should be done to the subject in this way, until there is built up a tradition of 
mathematical work devoted to biological problems, comparable to the researches upon which 
a mathematical physicist can draw in the resolution of special difficulties” (Fisher 1930, p. x). 
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reproduction, the number of offspring produced, as well as the average life span or 
longevity. Variation in these traits is enormous; some organisms go through a long 
larval phase before they mature, just to reproduce once and then die quickly. Other 
species enjoy a steady output of offspring almost throughout their lifetime, some over 
hundreds of seasons. Life history theory tries to explain why each species has the life 5	  
history traits it does. But in order to do so, it needs to consider the space of all logically 
possible trait combinations. Typically, life history theorists will try to show that an 
organism’s life cycle is somehow adapted or optimized. But of course, evolution cannot 
produce any combination of life history traits. There are constraints or trade-offs that 
limit the range of possible values that the different life history characters can take. For 10	  
example, it is widely thought by life history theorists that reproduction has a cost: 
Producing more offspring reduces longevity, both because it is inherently dangerous and 
because the metabolic resources used for reproduction are diverted from the 
maintenance of the body. Thus, it is not possible to maximize both the number of 
offspring and longevity at the same time.  15	  
The role of such constraints or trade-offs is sometimes explained with the help of a 
fictive creature known as a “Darwinian demon”. This is an organism “which can 
optimize all aspects of fitness simultaneously” (Law 1979, p. 399). By an “aspect of 
fitness”, Law means a character such the number of offspring or the life span. 
Obviously, a genotype that produces more offspring and lives longer than his 20	  
conspecifics would quickly dominate the population, such that this genotype will be the 
only one present. His fitness would be vastly superior. So why don’t naturally occurring 
organisms become fitter and fitter, eventually turning into Darwinian demons? This is 
one of the central questions of life history theory. There are many answers that have 
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been given to this question, but they usually involve some kind of trade-off or constraint 
that prevents a species of maximizing all aspects of fitness at the same time. 
Thus, even if Fisher’s example of a three- or n-sex biology is questionable, the 
principle that he was trying to illustrate is an important one: When giving an 
evolutionary explanation, biologists cannot be content to consider just actual organisms. 5	  
They must also examine a range of logically possible organisms that are defined by a 
character space. The explanation will then show why the traits of actual organisms take 
certain values within this character space. The explanation will typically be based on the 
assumption that all other trait combinations have been eliminated by natural selection. 
But showing that some trait combination is actually the fittest that is available given the 10	  
constraints, trade-offs etc. requires that the fitness values for different possible 
organisms be estimated. Of course, the same strategy is necessary in order to show that 
some trait has not been optimized by natural selection, so there is no presumption of 
adaptationism here (cf. Gould and Lewontin 1979). 
Fisher’s example aside, can we find in the explanatory practice that we have just 15	  
outlined any use of thought experiment? What about the idea of a Darwinian demon, 
this “mythical entity […] that grows quickly, breeds fast, outcompetes all and never 
ages” (Bonsall 2006), p. 120)? Is this demon comparable to Maxwell’s demon? In fact, 
there are interesting parallels in terms of the role that these two demons play. Maxwell 
imagined two chambers filled with gas of different temperature (see article on thought 20	  
experiments in physics, this volume?). In between the two chambers there would be a 
door that is controlled by the demon. The demon would open the door whenever a faster 
than average molecule were about to pass from the cooler to the warmer gas, and also 
when a slower than average molecule was about to pass from the warmer to the cooler 
side. Thus, heat would spontaneously flow from the cooler to the warmer body, in 25	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violation of the Second Law of thermodynamics. Maxwell’s demon describes a scenario 
that is supposed to be physically impossible and challenges theoretical physics to give 
an explanation of what physical principles prevent Maxwell’s imaginative scenario from 
being realized. (The standard answer is that Maxwell’s demon would need to acquire 
information about the velocity and trajectory of gas molecules, which would generate 5	  
enough entropy to offset the entropy reduction generated by the demon’s gate 
controlling of molecules.) It could be suggested that the role of the Darwinian demon is 
similar: It describes a biologically impossible scenario such that biologists are 
challenged to explain why it is impossible. While Maxwell’s demon scenario seems 
more imaginative, both are fictions and thus involve the imagination.  10	  
But it should also be noted that the Darwinian demon is hardly indispensable for 
evolutionary biologists to do their work (unlike, perhaps, some thought experiments in 
physics). This is evident because there was important theoretical work done in life 
history theory before the demon was introduced in 1979 (by Richard Law). Fisher’s 
own work is a case in point. The evolutionary biologist Michael B. Bonsall refers to the 15	  
Darwinian demon as an “iconic representation” that serves to “focus the thoughts and 
ideas presented” (p. 120). This would suggest a mainly pedagogical role for the 
Darwinian demon, perhaps much like Fisher’s case of three sexes. 
Are there any reasons for thinking that thought experimenting plays a more 
prominent role in population genetics, i.e., a role that goes beyond mere illustration? In 20	  
fact, there could be such reasons. Sober (2011) has argued that some mathematical 
models of evolutionary biology provide a priori causal knowledge. This seems like 
quite a radical claim at first, as causal knowledge is widely thought to be empirical in 
nature (due to the extremely influential arguments by David Hume). However, Sober’s 
claim is not that population genetic models such as Fisher’s sex ratio model mentioned 25	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above can provide any knowledge about actual causes. Rather, what these models can 
do is to tell the biologist that under certain conditions, conditions that may be real or 
hypothetical, some state of a population of organisms would promote some other state. 
For example, an unbalanced state of a population with respect to sex ratio would 
promote an increase, on an evolutionary time scale, in females that have a tendency for 5	  
producing more offspring of the minority sex.  
Sober’s argument is philosophically sophisticated and we lack the space here to 
give it a proper treatment. Clearly, Sober’s “would promote”-locution is in need of 
explication; it is not clear if it can be interpreted causally while at the same time 
maintaining it's a priori status (see Lange and Rosenberg 2011). 10	  
 
4. Molecular Biology 
For the most part, discussion about thought experiments in biology has focused on 
evolutionary biology. However, there are also candidates to be found in other fields of 
biology. We shall discuss two examples from mid-20th century molecular biology. The 15	  
first example concerns protein synthesis and the genetic code, the other is about protein 
folding and the so-called “Levinthal paradox”.  
In 1958, the co-discoverer of the double-helix structure of DNA Francis Crick 
published a remarkable paper simply titled “on protein synthesis” (Crick 1958). In this 
paper, he attempted to draw together all that was known at that time about the synthesis 20	  
of proteins by living cells and then formulate the outlines of a mechanism. The paper 
became famous for containing a hypothesis that Crick dubbed the “Central Dogma of 
Molecular Biology” (it was really a hypothesis at this stage; Crick later reported that he 
misapplied the term “dogma”). According to the Central Dogma, genetic information 
flows from DNA to RNA to protein, but not in the other direction. What Crick meant by 25	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this is that the sequence of DNA nucleotide bases determines the sequence of RNA 
bases, which in turn determines the sequence of amino acids in proteins. The converse is 
not true according to Crick; RNA does not determine DNA sequence (which turned out 
to be incorrect) and protein sequence does not determine RNA sequence (which is still 
considered to be correct today).  5	  
For Crick, this hypothesis was a solution to one of the great puzzles of biology: 
namely, the question of how a living cell can make thousands of different specific 
protein molecules. While much was known in 1958 how a cell can make other 
biomolecules (carbohydrates, lipids), the case of the proteins was trickier. The reason 
was the following: Other biomolecules are typically made by specific enzymes. But 10	  
obviously, this cannot be how the cell can make different proteins because enzymes are 
proteins themselves. So to make a specific protein such as hemoglobin, the cell would 
need a specific enzyme. But to make this enzyme, it would need another enzyme and so 
on. This mechanism would thus generate an infinite regress. Crick concluded that some 
kind of code was necessary to specify the amino acid composition of all the different 15	  
proteins made by a cell. According to this idea, the amino acid sequence of each protein 
was determined by the DNA base sequence of a gene. The code, which came to be 
known as the “genetic code” later, determines which amino acid sequence is specified 
by any arbitrary DNA sequence, just like the Morse code determines what letter of the 
alphabet is specified by a combination of short and long signals.  20	  
Crick thus not only predicted the existence of a genetic code, he also provided some 
constraints as to how this code might look like. (We are simplifying the history here. 
Crick was not the first to engage in such considerations, but his speculations turned out 
to be remarkably accurate. For historical details see Judson 1979). Since there are 
exactly 20 different naturally occurring amino acids that compose all the proteins in any 25	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living organism, it was clear that more than one nucleotide base was necessary to 
encode these amino acids. For there are only four nucleotide bases, usually abbreviated 
as A, T, G and C. Let us image that each amino acid were specified by two bases in the 
genetic code. Because there are 24 = 16 combinations of nucleotides, this would not be 
enough for 20 amino acids. Therefore, the code had to be at least a triplet code. But 5	  
there are already 34 = 64 triplet combinations of four bases, therefore the code had to be 
redundant. This means that at least some amino acids must correspond to several base 
triplets, or else there would have to be meaningless codons. 
Remarkably, all this is exactly what was found in the 1960s through much 
painstaking experimental work using protein-synthesizing cell extracts that were 10	  
programmed with artificial polynucleotides. The genetic code was “cracked” and the 
exact mapping of base triplets to amino acids was unraveled. But Crick (with some help 
from other scientists) had figured out some of this on the basis of theoretical 
considerations alone. 
We suggest that some parts of Crick’s reasoning show some of the characteristic 15	  
marks of a thought experiment: In particular, Crick examined several hypothetical or 
counterfactual scenarios, including a scenario where each protein is made by a specific 
enzyme as well as a scenario with a duplet code. He then showed that these scenarios 
were not possible, thus lending support to other scenarios such as the triplet code. Thus, 
as in the other cases discussed so far, thought experimenting was used in order to 20	  
explore logical spaces of possibility and to identify some regions in these spaces as not 
only logically but biologically possible. Having thus noticed an important similarity to 
classic thought experiments, we should also point out that some aspects of this example 
fit the category less well. In particular, can we say that Crick used his imagination when 
reasoning about the genetic code? The difficulty with this is that his considerations 25	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appear to be quite abstract and based more on a principle of causality and simple math 
than on imagining a fictive scenario (such as in the case of Maxwell’s demon). But all 
imagination might require principles and some of the classical thought experiments 
from physics are also quite abstract and need not imagine a particular scenario (e.g., 
Galileo’s). Thus, it is difficult to say if this is a case of imagining or not.  5	  
Another issue is the exact epistemic role of Crick’s considerations. Did it consist in 
the non-empirical evaluation of theoretical hypotheses? In a sense, one could say that 
Crick was examining the truth of certain hypotheses about the mechanism of protein 
synthesis. On the other hand, it is also clear that he did not consider these considerations 
as definitive proof of any theoretical hypothesis. The mechanism of protein synthesis 10	  
was clearly to be established experimentally, which it eventually was. So perhaps one 
could say that what we have here is a different epistemic use of thought experiment, 
perhaps a use that is properly located in the context of discovery rather the context of 
justification (cf. Weber 2005, Ch. 3). In other words, the thought experiment was used 
here in order to generate rather than evaluate theoretical hypotheses. 15	  
Another example from the history of molecular biology is the so-called “Levinthal 
paradox”. In 1969, Cyrus Levinthal surprised the scientific community with a simple 
argument that called into question the received view of how protein chains fold into 
their three-dimensional structure (Levinthal 1969) . According to the received view, a 
newly synthesized protein chain will randomly twist and move about until it has found 20	  
the three-dimensional structure that corresponds to its lowest energy state. This state is 
given by the intramolecular interactions (hydrophobic interactions and hydrogen bonds) 
that are possible between the different parts of the molecule. Now, Levinthal made a 
very simple calculation. He first observed that a protein consisting of 150 amino acid 
residues has about 450 degrees of freedom, of which 150 are due to possible variation in 25	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bond angles of the side chains while 300 are due to rotations of peptide bonds (the 
chemical bonds that keep a chain of amino acids together to form a protein). Assuming 
that each peptide bond can assume 10 different states (a conservative assumption), there 
will already be 10300 different protein configurations. But this would mean that it takes 
far too long for a protein to find its state of lowest energy by a random process. For 5	  
many proteins fold into their correct conformation within just a few seconds Levinthal 
calculated that even when a protein tries different conformations extremely rapidly, 
there wouldn’t be time to try out more than about 108. Therefore, the assumption that 
proteins fold into their state of lowest energy must be wrong. It is much more likely that 
it finds some local (as opposed to global) energy minimum in a series of steps or 10	  
“nucleation points” that are due to local interactions in neighboring amino acids.  
It is remarkable that a simple consideration such as Levinthal’s can topple a widely 
held theoretical assumption based on an established physical theory (thermodynamics). 
The case is similar to Crick’s: Levinthal also imagined a fictive scenario that defines a 
space of logical possibilities. Then, he showed that only a small region of this logical 15	  
space is actually accessible for real proteins to occupy. This, we suggest, is the hallmark 
of a thought experiment in biology. 
 
5. Artificial Life and Computational Modeling in Biology 
Several authors have suggested that artificial life and other computational approaches 20	  
are a form of thought experimenting (Dennett, 1994; Swan 2009), therefore it is 
appropriate to briefly discuss these approaches here. 
Traditionally, simulation is used to calculate possible fates of dynamical systems 
for which there is no analytic expression of trajectory. This is often the case in systems 
described by coupled differential equations, but also in so-called agent-based models, 25	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where a number of agents behave according to simple rules, but collectively produce 
complex emerging patterns. By revealing these patterns, simulation allows scientists to 
evaluate whether a particular model possibly explains a phenomenon (Winsberg 2014). 
Agent-based models are much used in artificial life (A-life). An example is the 
virtual world of Tierra created by the evolutionary biologist T. Ray (1993), in which the 5	  
supposed conditions for biological evolution are reproduced in silico to explore the 
consequences of current theoretical assumptions. More specific studies aim at 
simulating population behaviors such as the grouping of bird flocks, mammal herds or 
fish schools, by implementing individual behavioral rules and testing their effect at the 
population level. These studies suggest possible explanations and proved to be 10	  
particularly useful in showing what minimal abilities are required from individual 
agents in order to achieve the complex patterns observed at population level (see 
Reynolds, 1987, cited in Swan, 2009). 
A philosophical analysis of A-life simulations as a kind of thought experimenting 
has been proposed by Swan (2009), who takes up Daniel Dennett’s idea of considering 15	  
A-life as a way of constructing “thought experiments of indefinite complexity” (Dennett 
1994). The starting point of her account is that both in simulations as well as in classical 
thought experiments the systems under study can be manipulated at will. Specifically, it 
is possible to examine how a system obeying certain rules will behave. This feature 
provides a mean to “reason from effects back to probable causes” (Swan 2009, p. 696), 20	  
which is also the hallmark of abduction as described by Charles Sanders Peirce (1958).4  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Abduction as characterized by Peirce is the process by which one constructs hypotheses to 
explain a particular fact. Today, it is sometimes referred to as “inference to the best 
explanation” (Lipton 2004). 
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Although these computer simulations seem to perfectly fit the role suggested above 
– providing hypothetical scenarios to explore the logical field defined by a theoretical 
framework – they don’t satisfy the requirement that thought experiments must involve 
the imagination.5 Thus, it seems that in the current literature on thought experiments, the 
term is used at least in two different senses. In one, wider sense, the label “thought 5	  
experiment” is given to any kind of theoretical model (including computational models) 
that involve hypothetical or counterfactual scenarios. In the other, more narrow sense, 
thought experiments also involve the mental powers of imagination.  
 
6. A Constructive Role for Thought Experiments? 10	  
A common feature of all the cases presented here is the exploration of a field of possibilities 
followed by an evaluation of statements about what is biologically possible. The relevant 
possibilities can include logical possibilities, as in Fisher’s idea of evaluating hypothetical 
three-sex organisms in order to understand why there mostly are only two. Alternatively, the 
salient possibilities may be constrained by the principles of a theoretical framework, like in 15	  
the case of Crick’s discussion of the genetic code, in Levinthal’s paradox, life history traits, or 
evolutionary simulations of the A-life application Tierra. The outcome of the thought 
experiment is an evaluation of statements expressing such logical or theoretical possibilities, 
which seems to depend on the accordance with further biological principles pertaining to the 
particular region of the logical space that is visited. In general, it seems that antecedent 20	  
theoretical knowledge plays a major role in most cases, so biological thought experiments for 
the most part don’t just rely on untutored intuitions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 This is the reason why Chandrasekharan, Nersessian and Subramanian (2012) don’t consider 
computer simulations as thought experiments but rather as an alternative approach. 
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In some cases, thought experiments reveal constraints that had not yet been taken into 
account in the theoretical framework. Examples for this include the time constraints in 
Levinthal’s paradox, the impossibility of an infinity of specific biosynthetic enzymes in 
Crick’s reasoning about the mechanism of protein synthesis or the inexistence of a Darwinian 
demon. When the general theoretical framework cannot cope with the particular constraints 5	  
involved in the hypothetical case, thought experimenting seems to serve the purpose of 
pinpointing explanatory defects or eventually the existence of a problematic assumption in the 
theoretical framework. In other cases, the thought experiment seems to support the idea that 
the proposed theoretical framework sufficiently explains typical hypothetical cases, like in 
Darwin’s thought experiments or some A-life simulations.  10	  
Some of the experiments discussed above seem to occur in a context of discovery in a 
wider sense, where novel hypotheses are produced and evaluated prior to experimental 
verification. Since thought experiments carry some evidential power in the assessment of 
possible explanatory hypotheses, but seem nevertheless unable to provide sufficient 
confirmation, their role might be construed along the line of Curd’s (1980) “assessment” of 15	  
research hypotheses, which occurs in the context of discovery rather than the context of 
justification because it cannot provide sufficient justification, but has some justificatory value 
since it allows to make an informed choice among a set of possible hypotheses. 
In other cases, thought experiments might not lead directly to testable hypotheses, like in 
the case of some A-life simulations, Levinthal’s paradox, or Darwin’s demon, but their role 20	  
there is to reveal a lack of explanatory constraints and the need for further theoretical 
hypotheses. 
This picture of thought experimenting as exploring and evaluating a field of theoretical 
possibilities suggests two kinds of theorizing activities that relate to the imagination criterion. 
The first activity is the choice of theoretical assumptions that should constitute the most 25	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relevant constraints pertaining to the particular situation. The second activity consists in 
inferring the consequences following from these constraints. These consequences seem 
mainly to be obtained either by deduction or by computational simulation, but other means 
have been proposed, like the appeal to mental models suggested by Nersessian (1992).6 Since 
in simulations the step of inferring the consequences of a set of assumptions is delegated to a 5	  
computer, their status as thought experiment may be denied (Chandrasekharan, Nersessian 
and Subramanian 2012; cf. also the entry on computer simulations in this book), but the 
choice of the assumptions still depends on the theoretician’s imagination and this may suffice 
to view, with Dennett and Swan, computational simulations as extended thought experiments, 
just like the use of paper and pencil suitably enhances geometrical thought experiments. Our 10	  
examples thus seem to provide a continuum of cases where some rely more on the evaluation 
of theoretical assumptions, like in the Darwinian thought experiments, whereas others 
highlight more the inferential aspects, be it deductive or computational, like in the case of 
Levinthal’s paradox or A-life simulations. But it seems that both assumption evaluation and 
inferential work are present as aspects in all the cases. 15	  
The examples presented in this article suggest that thought experimenting may widely be 
used in scientific modeling as a mean of evaluating the relevance of a theoretical model as 
well as its consistency with other models pertaining to similar cases. In this picture, thought 
experiments are less important than sometimes assumed for the justification of particular 
statements, but they appear to be much wider spread in the scientific practice. They may play 20	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 It is not clear in the case of the view defending Platonic insights defended by Brown  (1991), 
wether these insights occur at the level of the choice of assumptions, inference of their 
consequences or both. Maybe though it could be considered as another way of inference 
making to be added to this list.	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an important role for the integration of theoretically scattered scientific fields and provide 
guidance for scientific research. 
The results provided here should be relativized in any case to the selection of cases we 
made in the first place. Our broad criteria allowed us to choose what we consider the most 
significant cases of thought experimenting in biology, but philosophers assuming a more 5	  
specific view of thought experimenting may end up with a different picture.  
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